University of Massachusetts Amherst
From the SelectedWorks of Jiyoung Park

Winter February 11, 2013

Error-related brain activity reveals self-centric
motivation: Culture matters
Jiyoung Park, University of Massachusetts - Amherst
Shinobu Kitayama

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/jiyoung-park/9/

Error-Related Brain Activity Reveals Self-Centric Motivation:
Culture Matters
Shinobu Kitayama and Jiyoung Park

To secure the interest of the personal self (vs. social others) is considered a fundamental human motive,
but the nature of the motivation to secure the self-interest is not well understood. To address this issue,
we assessed electrocortical responses of European Americans and Asians as they performed a flanker task
while instructed to earn as many reward points as possible either for the self or for their same-sex friend.
For European Americans, error-related negativity (ERN)—an event-related-potential component contingent on error responses—was significantly greater in the self condition than in the friend condition.
Moreover, post-error slowing—an index of cognitive control to reduce errors—was observed in the self
condition but not in the friend condition. Neither of these self-centric effects was observed among Asians,
consistent with prior cross-cultural behavioral evidence. Interdependent self-construal mediated the effect
of culture on the ERN self-centric effect. Our findings provide the first evidence for a neural correlate
of self-centric motivation, which becomes more salient outside of interdependent social relations.
Keywords: self-centric motivation, self-serving bias, independent and interdependent self-construals,
cultural neuroscience, error-related negativity (ERN)

Self-interest is considered a fundamental human motive. Indeed,
many currents of modern Western thought, including theories in
both neoclassic economics (Hobbes, 1651; Smith, 1759) and social
and behavioral sciences (Campbell, 1975; Greenwald, 1980), are
built on this premise. In this tradition of thought, the self is deemed
to be autonomous and self-contained (Morris, 1972; Sampson,
1988), and, in part because of this, the self is assumed to justifiably
pursue the interest of the self in lieu of the interest of others
(Miller, 1999). So far, however, much of this debate is limited to
cultural and historical analyses, with little known about its grounding in neurobiological mechanisms.
Our goal in the current work was twofold. First, we tested
whether the assumed primacy of self-interest is reflected in neurobiological mechanisms of error processing, which are grounded
in the ventral striatal, subcortical regions (Frank & Claus, 2006;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Second, we examined whether such
neurobiological mechanisms might be culturally bound. This effort
will enable us to go beyond existing behavioral evidence to show
the potential role of culture in shaping neurobiological processes.

Self-Centric Motivation
The hypothesis that self-interest is an important motive guiding social cognition and social behavior is strongly suggested
by self-serving bias (Langer, 1975; Miller & Ross, 1975). For
example, individuals take credit for their success while blaming
external influences for their failure (Miller & Ross, 1975).
Likewise, they tend to have unrealistically inflated and optimistic views of themselves (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Although
these phenomena suggest the presence of a powerful psychological motive to pursue self-interest (herein called self-centric
motivation), they fall short of identifying the nature of this
motive itself.
It could be argued, on the one hand, that self-centric motivation
is derived from a conscious, explicit goal of presenting the self in
a favorable light (Schlenker, 1980). If this were the case, selfserving effects could be a product of deliberate self-presentation.
On the other hand, it would seem also possible that self-centric
motivation has a deeper neurophysiological root. For example,
once the self becomes relevant and thus activated in a given
situation, potential rewards available in the situation will become
more salient (because the self is a direct beneficiary of the rewards), thereby recruiting neural mechanisms of “wanting”—the
mesocorticolimbic system involving the ventral striatal regions
that modulates incentive salience (Berridge, 2012). The reward
value of achieving a desired outcome will be enhanced as a result.
We predicted that if self-centric motivation has a deep neurobiological basis such as this, there should be an electrocortical marker
of this motivation.
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Neural Marker of Self-Centric Motivation
Our first aim in the current work was to explore electrocortical
markers of self-centric motivation by examining neural responses
involved in error processing (error-related negativity, or ERN;
Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring,
Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). The ERN is an eventrelated brain potential, which is observed within 100 ms after an
erroneous response in speeded reaction time tasks. Because of an
emphasis given to response speed in such tasks, an individual
sometimes responds on the basis of partially available information
on the stimulus before the impinging stimulus is fully processed,
thereby increasing the likelihood of errors. However, even after the
actual response is executed, the stimulus processing will continue
and eventually produce a more veridical representation of the
stimulus, which implies a correct response. When the two representations (the actual response and the correct response) are unmatched, this gives rise to an error signal, the ERN (Coles,
Scheffers, & Holroyd, 2001).
When the motivation to perform well in the task at hand is
enhanced, the responder will allocate more processing resources to
both the computation of the correct response and the comparison
between the actual response and the correct response, resulting in
a stronger mismatch signal. Consistent with this analysis, the ERN
is known to increase as a function of motivational significance
associated with the task at hand (e.g., Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak,
Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). We therefore anticipated that the
ERN would be greater when an erroneous response was made in a
task the person performed to earn reward points for the self than
when such an error was made in a task he or she performed to earn
reward points for someone else (e.g., a close friend), as long as the
person was self-centrically motivated.

Cultural Modulation of Self-Centric Motivation
Another important aim in the current work was to examine
possible cultural variation in the neural marker of self-centric
motivation. Over the last two decades, numerous cross-cultural
studies have shown that self-serving effects are much weaker
among Asians than among European Americans (see Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). For example, self-serving attributions of success and failure appear quite weak in Asia (Kitayama, Takagi, & Matsumoto, 1995), and, likewise, Asians tend
to hold more realistic assessments of the self vis-à-vis others
(Heine & Lehman, 1995). Moreover, whereas European Americans spontaneously elaborate on positive self-relevant information,
Asians do so with respect to negative self-relevant information
(Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). The
attenuation of self-serving bias among Asians is consistent with
the hypothesis that Asian selves are more interdependent (vs.
independent), and, thus, their construal of the self is extended to
include close others (Endo, Heine, & Lehman, 2000). Accordingly,
the motivation to enhance the self, relative to relevant social
others, may be quite weak among Asians.
One important shortcoming of the current literature on cultural
variation in self-serving bias is that it draws nearly exclusively on
explicit self-reports. Thus, it is hard to preclude the possibility that
the attenuation or absence of self-serving bias among Asians
reflects a culture-specific tactic of self-presentation fostered by the
culture’s modesty norms. However, if Asians should show an

attenuated self-centric effect even in the ERN—a neural activity
that is arguably automatic (Amodio et al., 2004) and regulated
closely by subcortical reward-processing systems (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Münte et al., 2008)—this cultural difference would be
hard to understand with self-presentation alone. We thus tested
whether the increased ERN in a task individuals perform to earn
rewards for the self (vs. a close other) would be either attenuated
or vanished for Asians.

Present Work
To test the hypothesis that self-centric motivation manifests
itself at an electrocortical level, we monitored the brain activities
of European American and Asian participants via electroencephalogram (EEG) while a computer task was performed to earn
reward points for themselves and for a close, same-sex friend. We
anticipated that the ERN would be greater when individuals performed a task to earn rewards for themselves (vs. their friend), as
long as they have strong self-centric motivation. We further anticipated that the self-centric effect would be weaker for Asians,
who are likely to be more interdependent, than for European
Americans.

Method
Participants
Thirty-nine University of Michigan undergraduates participated
in the study (24 female, Mage ⫽ 19.59 years, SDage ⫽ 1.37).
Nineteen were European Americans (14 female, Mage ⫽ 19.47
years, SDage ⫽ 1.31), and the remaining 20 were Asians (10
female, Mage ⫽ 19.70 years, SDage ⫽ 1.45). Nine Asian participants were born in East Asian countries such as China, Korea, and
Taiwan, spending no more than 7 years in the United States, and
the remaining 11 participants were Asian Americans, who were
born in the United States. Participants received $20 or course
credit in exchange for their participation. All participants were
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No
gender effect was found.

Procedure
Upon their arrival in the lab, participants were told that their
brain activities would be monitored while they performed a simple
computer task. After the attachment of EEG electrodes, participants were asked to perform a letter version of the flanker task
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) in a darkened room. The stimuli were
presented on a Dell E551c 15-in. CRT monitor wth E-Prime
software version 1.1. Participants were instructed to identify a
center letter among a set of five letters that were flashed at the
center of the screen (HHHHH, SSSSS, HHSHH, or SSHSS). One
third of the trials were congruent trials (HHHHH or SSSSS), and
the remaining two thirds were incongruent trials (HHSHH or
SSHSS). Each letter sequence occupied 0.4° of visual angle vertically and 2.2° of it horizontally. Each trial started with a fixation
cross that appeared at the center of the screen for 100 ms. After a
blank screen (300 ms), participants saw one of the four letter
sequences, which lasted on the screen for 100 ms. They then
reported the identity of the center letter by pressing one of two
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response keys on the typing board. The key assignments were
counterbalanced across participants. The next trial started 900 ms
after each response. In order to keep the minimum 10% of error
rate, whenever the error rate in a given block did not reach 10%,
we instructed participants to respond faster in the next block.
Participants were encouraged to respond as quickly as possible
without sacrificing accuracy. They were told that their response
would be monitored and correct responses that were faster than
their median response time would be converted into points. Presented with colored photos of 15 gift items (e.g., mug, hoodie),
they were further told that they would have an opportunity to use
the points they would earn to choose one gift item for themselves
and another gift item for their friend, respectively. At this point,
they were asked to nominate a close, same-sex friend who lived on
the campus and write down the name of the friend. Thus, their goal
was to earn as many reward points as possible to receive gifts for
both the self and the friend. Participants were told that the gift
items of their choice would be mailed to both them and their friend
at a later date.
The computer task consisted of a total of 16 blocks, with 60
trials in each block (960 trials in total). During half of the blocks,
participants earned points for themself (self blocks), whereas during the remaining half they did so for their friend (friend blocks).
The order of the self versus friend blocks was counterbalanced
across participants, such that half of the participants performed the
self blocks first (i.e., 4 self, 4 friend, 4 self, and 4 friend) and the
other half performed the friend blocks first (i.e., 4 friend, 4 self, 4
friend, and 4 self).

Physiological Recording and Processing
The EEG was recorded with 64 electrodes placed according to
the extended International 10 –20 system in a nylon cap and
referenced to the left mastoid. The electrooculogram (EOG) was
recorded from additional channels at the outer canthi of both eyes
and above and below the left eye. EEG and EOG signals were
amplified with a band-pass of DC to 104 Hz by BioSemi
ActiveTwo system and were sampled with 512 Hz. All data were
re-referenced to the averaged left and right mastoid off-line and
then resampled at 256 Hz. The data were baseline corrected by
using 200- to 100-ms pre-response voltage and were corrected for
ocular artifacts (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983). The EEG
recordings for incorrect and correct responses were then averaged
separately. Trials with amplitudes exceeding ⫾100 V were eliminated from the final averages. The number of error trials included
in the analysis after artifact rejection was no different across the
cultural groups (European Americans: M ⫽ 60.76, SE ⫽ 7.07;
Asians: M ⫽ 64.50, SE ⫽ 6.89) or between the self and friend
conditions (self condition: M ⫽ 61.53, SE ⫽ 5.09; friend condition: M ⫽ 63.73, SE ⫽ 7.49), Fs ⬍ 1. Because the ERN peaked
around 35 ms after erroneous responses, it was quantified as the
mean amplitude between 10 ms and 60 ms after the erroneous
response at the frontocentral midline electrode (FCz).

Post-Experimental Questionnaire
After finishing the flanker task, participants filled out a 24-item
Singelis self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994), which yielded separate scores for independent self-construal (e.g., “I always try to

have my own opinions”; ␣s ⫽ .78 and .82, for European Americans and Asians, respectively) and interdependent self-construal
(e.g., “I avoid having conflicts with members of my group”; ␣s ⫽
.54 and .75). Participants then filled out measures that assessed the
quality of the relationship with the friend they chose at the beginning of the study (who was to receive the gift earned for him or
her). They rated perceived closeness by choosing one of seven
varying degrees of overlap between two circles (Inclusion of Other
in the Self Scale; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), length of the
relationship in years, and perceived supportiveness (12-item Interpersonal Support Evaluation List; Cohen, Mermelstein, Kamarck,
& Hoberman, 1985; ␣s ⫽ .92 and .97, for European Americans
and Asians, respectively).
Participants also responded to two questions designed to assess
their motivation to perform the task well in both the self condition
and the friend condition. They indicated how engaged (1 ⫽ not
engaged at all, 7 ⫽ very much engaged) they were when they
performed the task in the self condition and in the friend condition
and how satisfied (1 ⫽ not satisfied at all, 7 ⫽ very much satisfied)
they were with their performance in the self and the friend condition, respectively. Finally, participants rated how difficult (1 ⫽ not
difficult at all, 7 ⫽ very much difficult) the task was.

Results
Self-Report Measures
The post-experimental questionnaire showed that the friends
that European American and Asian participants chose were no
different in terms of closeness (4.90 vs. 4.20 for European Americans and Asians, respectively), F(1, 37) ⫽ 2.26, p ⬎ .14; length
of relationship (4.26 vs. 3.45), F ⬍ 1; and supportiveness (4.47 vs.
4.04), F ⫽ 2.72, p ⬎ .10. Participants were also reportedly engaged as strongly in the task of earning points for the self as they
were in the task of earning points for the friend (European Americans: 4.82 vs. 4.82; Asians: 5.03 vs. 5.08), Fs ⬍ 1. The engagement rating was no different across the cultural groups in both the
self condition and the friend condition (Fs ⬍ 1). They also reported that they were equally satisfied with their performance in
the self and in the friend condition (European Americans: 3.95 vs.
3.84; Asians: 3.08 vs. 3.10), Fs ⱕ 1. The mean satisfaction was
higher for European Americans than for Asians (3.90 vs. 3.09),
F ⫽ 5.04, p ⬍ .05, 2p ⫽ .12. This is likely due to a general
tendency of European Americans to respond more positively than
Asians do (Heine et al., 1999). In addition, the two cultural groups
did not differ in their perceived task difficulty, suggesting that the
task was equally demanding for both groups (3.68 vs. 3.95 for
European Americans and Asians, respectively), F ⬍ 1. For descriptive statistics for the questionnaire measures, see Table 1.

Behavioral Performance
We found little difference in the performance of the flanker
task between the self condition and the friend condition regardless of the cultural backgrounds of the participants. First, we
submitted accuracy to a 2 (culture: European Americans vs.
Asians) ⫻ 2 (condition: self vs. friend) ⫻ 2 (congruency:
congruent trials vs. incongruent trials) ⫻ 2 (condition order:
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Post-Experimental
Questionnaire Measures
European
Americans
Measure
Relationship with the
friend
Perceived closeness
Length of relationship
Perceived supportiveness
Task engagement
Self condition
Friend condition
Performance satisfaction
Self condition
Friend condition
Task difficulty
Overall
ⴱ

Error-Related Negativity

East Asians

Cultural
differences

M

SE

M

SE

F(1, 37)

2p

4.90
4.26
4.47

0.33
1.03
0.19

4.20
3.45
4.04

0.32
1.00
0.18

2.26
0.32
2.72

.06
.01
.07

4.82
4.82

0.26
0.25

5.03
5.08

0.25
0.25

0.34
0.54

.01
.01

3.95
3.84

0.27
0.26

3.08
3.10

0.27
0.25

5.27ⴱ
4.29ⴱ

.13
.10

3.68

0.32

3.95

0.40

0.26

.01

p ⬍ .05.

self first vs. friend first) ⫻ 2 (key assignment: use of the
left/right response key for the “S” response and the right/left
response key for the “H” response) repeated measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with culture, condition order, and key
assignment as between-subjects factors and condition and congruency as within-subjects factors. One Asian participant’s data
were lost due to a computer program malfunction. The analysis
showed that accuracy was higher on congruent (vs. incongruent) trials (94.19 vs. 81.70), F(1, 30) ⫽ 134.00, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽
.82. This effect, however, did not significantly interact with
culture and/or condition (Fs ⬍ 1). The two cultural groups
showed virtually identical levels of accuracy in the self condition and in the friend condition (European Americans: 88.77 vs.
88.41; Asians: 87.36 vs. 87.23). Neither condition order nor key
assignment had any systematic effects.
Next, response time (RT) was analyzed within a 2 (culture) ⫻
2 (condition) ⫻ 2 (congruency) ⫻ 2 (response accuracy) ⫻ 2
(condition order) ⫻ 2 (key assignment) ANOVA. Three European American participants who did not make any error response on congruent trials in the friend condition were excluded
from this analysis. Overall, Asians were faster than European
Americans (238.23 vs. 279.55 ms), F(1, 27) ⫽ 9.69, p ⬍ .005,
2p ⫽ .26. Importantly, however, the two cultural groups did not
differ in their response time in the self versus the friend conditions (correct trial RTs: 305.67 vs. 306.67 ms for European
Americans and 269.25 vs. 271.22 ms for Asians; error trial RTs:
252.95 vs. 252.90 ms for European Americans and 203.17 vs.
209.29 ms for Asians), Fs ⬍ 1. For more detailed discussion on
response time, see the online supplemental materials.
The absence of any self-centric effects in task performance
might seem puzzling. However, in the present procedure, whenever participants made errors on less than 10% of the trials, we
encouraged them to respond faster on the next block. This
procedure was designed to ensure that the participants would
make a sufficiently large number of errors. The performance
might have therefore been constrained to mask any effects that
would be otherwise expected.

At the level of self-report, both European American and Asian
participants appear to have worked as hard for their friends as they
did for themselves. We anticipated, however, that the ERN would
reveal a contrastingly different picture. Although the magnitude of
the correct-response negativity (CRN) did not vary as a function of
either culture or condition, it was somewhat more positive for
Asians than for European Americans (6.46 vs. 4.38), F(1, 37) ⫽
2.53, p ⫽ .12. To take this CRN difference into account, we
analyzed the ERN-CRN difference scores as in previously work
(e.g., Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000; Tops, Boksem, Wester, Lorist,
& Meijman, 2006).
We performed a 2 (culture) ⫻ 2 (condition) ⫻ 2 (condition order)
⫻ 2 (key assignment) repeated measures ANOVA on the ERN (vs.
CRN) magnitude. Congruency (i.e., congruent vs. incongruent trials)
was not included in the design, because the error rate was very low on
the congruent trials. We found that European Americans showed a
clear self-centric effect (see Figure 1A). The ERN (relative to the
CRN) was significantly greater in the self condition than in the friend
condition (⫺12.04 vs. ⫺9.06), F(1, 15) ⫽ 10.93, p ⬍ .005, 2p ⫽ .42.
The topographic maps in Figure 1B show that the ERN is centered at
the FCz site. This pattern demonstrates the existence of self-centric
motivation, insofar as the same event becomes motivationally more
significant, at the neural level, when it implicates the interest of the
self versus other. In contrast, there was no ERN difference between
the self condition and the friend condition for Asians (⫺9.79 vs.
⫺10.04; see Figure 1C), F(1, 16) ⬍ 1. Although the ERN was clearly
centered at the FCz site, as in the European American data (Figure
1B), the ERN was no greater in the self (vs. friend) condition among
Asians (Figure 1D). Thus, consistent with previous cross-cultural
work, we found no evidence of self-centric motivation among Asians.
As implied by the pattern discussed above, the Culture ⫻
Condition interaction was significant, F(1, 31) ⫽ 9.08, p ⫽
.005, 2p ⫽ .23 (see Figure 2A). This interaction was not
qualified by any other variables. When the absolute magnitude
of the ERN was analyzed within a 2 (culture) ⫻ 2 (condition) ⫻
2 (condition order) ⫻ 2 (key assignment) ANOVA, the results
were no different, with a significant Culture ⫻ Condition interaction, F(1, 31) ⫽ 7.34, p ⬍ .05, 2p ⫽ .19 (see the online
supplemental materials for two additional interactions that were
significant).

Post-Error Slowing
Previous work suggests that increased ERN is often accompanied by post-error slowing—a prolonged response time on a
trial subsequent to commission of an error. Post-error slowing
is considered to reflect one’s effort to avoid making a further
error on the subsequent trial after an error, commonly assessed
by subtracting each participant’s average response time on
post-correct trials from the average response time on post-error
trials (Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005). The post-error
slowing was submitted to a 2 (culture) ⫻ 2 (condition) ⫻ 2
(condition order) ⫻ 2 (key assignment) repeated measures
ANOVA. As shown in Figure 2B, European Americans exhibited a significant post-error slowing in the self condition
(18.87), F(1, 15) ⫽ 18.69, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .56, but not in the
friend condition (5.78), F ⫽ 1.72, p ⬎ .20. In contrast, posterror slowing for Asians was virtually absent for both self and
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Figure 1. ERN (error-related negativity) and CRN (correct-response negativity) waveforms at FCz (A:
European Americans; C: Asians) and topographic maps of the mean ERN (error-correct difference) amplitudes
between 10 ms and 60 ms after the response (B: European Americans; D: Asians). In the topographic maps, red
colors represent regions of greater negativity. The view shows the top of the head, with the nose pointing upward.
The scalp maximum of the ERN occurs at the FCz electrode, indicated by the cross.

friend conditions (⫺0.89 vs. 1.65), Fs ⬍ 1. The Culture ⫻
Condition interaction was significant, F(1, 30) ⫽ 4.91, p ⬍ .05,
2p ⫽ .14. No other effects achieved statistical significance.

Self-Centric Effects and Interdependent Self-Construal
Because interdependent social relations require attention and
care paid to others, attention to the personal self that is detached
A

Self

from social relations in general, and commitment to self-interest
in particular, may be antithetical to interdependence (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). We thus expected that interdependent selfconstrual would negatively predict self-centric motivation.
First, two indices of self-centric motivation were obtained by
subtracting the self condition ERN (vs. CRN) from the friend
condition ERN (vs. CRN), on the one hand, and the friend condiB
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Figure 2. ERN-CRN amplitude (A) and post-error slowing (B) in the self condition and in the friend condition
for European Americans and Asians. Standard errors are indicated by the vertical bars. ERN ⫽ error-related
negativity; CRN ⫽ correct-response negativity.
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tion post-error slowing from the self condition post-error slowing,
on the other hand. For both measures, positive scores show greater
self-centric motivation. These two indices were significantly correlated (r ⫽ .36, p ⬍ .05).
Next, we examined independent and interdependent selfconstruals as assessed by the Singelis self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994). There was no cultural difference in independent selfconstrual (4.88 and 4.82, for Asians and European Americans,
respectively), F ⬍ 1. As expected, however, interdependent selfconstrual was higher for Asians than for European Americans
(4.98 vs. 4.64), although the difference was statistically marginal,
F(1, 37) ⫽ 3.54, p ⬍ .07, 2p ⫽ .09. Of importance, interdependent
self-construal was negatively associated with both indices of selfcentric motivation, albeit marginally for post-error slowing (ERN
vs. CRN: r ⫽ ⫺.44, p ⬍ .01; post-error slowing: r ⫽ ⫺.30, p ⬍
.07; see Figures 3A and B). Although the negative relationship
between the two variables was evident for both cultural groups
(ERN vs. CRN: rs ⫽ ⫺.47 and ⫺.31; post-error slowing: rs ⫽
⫺.30 and ⫺.10, for Asians and European Americans, respectively), it was no longer significant when analyzed separately for
each cultural group, except for one (the Asian correlation on the
ERN vs. CRN, r ⫽ ⫺.47, p ⬍ .05). This may be due to reduced
sample size. In neither case was the apparent cultural difference
significant (Zs ⬍ 1). No correlations were significant between
independent self-construal and the two indices of self-centric motivation (⫺.08 ⬍ r ⬍ .03, all ps ⬎ .60).
Note that culture (Asians ⫽ 0 vs. European Americans ⫽ 1) was
related, albeit marginally, to interdependent self-construal, b ⫽
⫺0.34, t(37) ⫽ ⫺1.88, p ⬍ .07. Moreover, culture was significantly related to the ERN self-centric effect (the enhanced ERN vs.
CRN in the self condition relative to the friend condition), b ⫽
2.53, t(37) ⫽ 2.45, p ⬍ .05. Because interdependent self-construal
is linked to the ERN self-centric effect, the cultural difference in
the ERN self-centric effect may prove to be mediated by interdependent self-construal. We found in a formal test of this analysis
that when both culture and interdependent self-construal were
included as joint predictors of the ERN self-centric effect, the path
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Neural Markers of Self-Centric Motivation
The most important contribution of the current work was to
establish a reliable neurophysiological marker of self-centric motivation. European American participants clearly showed an increased ERN when trying to earn reward points for themselves (vs.
a friend). Following previous evidence that the ERN originates
from the anterior cingulate cortex with a close link to mesocorticolimbic reward-processing systems and plays a significant role in
monitoring errors (Holroyd, Dien, & Coles, 1998; Miltner, Braun,
& Coles, 1997), we have reasoned that the key mediating mechanism of the ERN self-centric effect may involve increased salience of reward when the self is involved as its direct beneficiary.
Under these conditions, individuals may be motivated strongly to
pursue rewards while avoiding punishments. This enhanced incentive salience results in increased allocation of processing resources
on task-relevant information, thereby leading to a greater activation of the veridical representation of the stimulus, as well as a
more meticulous comparison between the response implied by this
representation (i.e., correct response) and a response that is actually executed before the stimulus processing is complete (i.e.,
actual response). The ERN signal should be potentiated as a result.
Moreover, the increased potency of the error signal should result in
a slowing of response on the next trial (i.e., post-error slowing),

B

European Americans

15

Self-centric effect (ERN-CRN)

Discussion

Self-centric effect (Post-error slowing)

Asians

from culture to the ERN self-centric effect was no longer significant, b ⫽ 1.73, t(36) ⫽ 1.57, ns. Importantly, the effect of
interdependence on the self-centric effect remained significant,
b ⫽ ⫺2.32, t(36) ⫽ ⫺2.43, p ⬍ .05. As shown in Figure 4, the
mediated path (culture ¡ interdependent self-construal ¡ the
ERN self-centric effect) was statistically significant (95% biascorrected bootstrapping confidence interval ⫽ [0.04, 2.35]). See
the online supplemental materials for the mediational results on
post-error slowing.
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Figure 3. The scatterplots with interdependent self-construal on the x-axis and the self-centric effect (A:
ERN-CRN; B: post-error slowing) on the y-axis. ERN ⫽ error-related negativity; CRN ⫽ correct-response
negativity.
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Figure 4. The mediation of the cultural difference in the ERN self-centric effect by interdependent selfconstrual (N ⫽ 39). Unstandardized coefficients are shown. The relationship between culture and the self-centric
effect is no longer significant after controlling for interdependent self-construal, as indicated in a parenthesis at
the top (1.73). The values in square brackets are 95% bias-corrected confidence interval from a bootstrap test
with 2,000 replications; the mediation is significant if the confidence interval does not include zero. ERN ⫽
error-related negativity. † p ⬍ .10. ⴱ p ⬍ .05.

because the responder tries to base his or her response on more
fully processed stimulus information.
The finding that the self-centric effect was absent among
Asians, not only in self-report but also in both the ERN and
post-error slowing, indicates that the absence of self-serving bias
among Asians is not due merely to self-presentation. In Asian
cultural contexts, interdependence is emphasized and, as a consequence, significant others are incorporated into the concept of the
self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). We should hasten to note that the
absence of the self-centric effect among Asians does not necessarily mean that they have no need or desire to pursue self-interest.
This effect shows, instead, that Asians have a more extended self
that encompasses close others as its part. The significant mediation
of the cultural difference on self-centric motivation by interdependent self-construal is consistent with this analysis. Future work
should use a neural measure of the overlap of representations
between the self and close others (Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007)
and test whether our ERN finding would be moderated by this
neural measure of the self– other overlap.
Although European Americans showed clear evidence of selfcentric motivation in the ERN marker, on a post-experimental
questionnaire they reported that they worked just as hard for their
friend as they did for themselves. The impartiality these participants claimed in their self-report might be a deliberate social
presentation. Alternatively, the self-report ratings might reflect
what our European American participants genuinely believed
about their own behaviors, and, if so, the awareness regarding their
own impartiality at the conscious level might prove to be selfdeceptive. This issue also deserves further investigation.

polymorphisms. The DRD4 gene variant that strongly predisposes
its carriers to heightened reward sensitivity (7-VNTR) is quite
prevalent among European Americans, but this variant is virtually
absent among Asians (Chang, Kidd, Livak, Pakstis, & Kidd,
1996). Thus, there might be some genetic contribution to the
cultural variation in self-centric motivation we documented in the
current work.
Future work should also explore whether the ERN might be
used to capture other motivational effects. For example, Hajcak et
al. (2005) showed that the ERN is greater when the experimenter
stands right behind the participant and monitors his or her performance, thereby giving rise to a condition for self-evaluative threat.
Further, this type of social evaluative threat might be induced by
mere exposure to an image of a watching face, especially for those
who are interdependent (e.g., Asians; Park & Kitayama, 2012).
The hypothesis that the ERN is potentiated under the conditions of
threat to the self also comes from other recent studies. For example, the magnitude of the ERN is correlated with an increase of a
defensive startle reflex right after the commission of an error
(Hajcak & Foti, 2008). Conversely, the magnitude of the ERN is
attenuated after manipulations designed to give a sense of security
(Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012).
Recent research increasingly suggests that the ERN has a motivational component, but it should be clear that the motivation that
is evoked is intrinsically intertwined with cognitive mechanisms
underlying the detection of errors or the monitoring of conflicts.
Future work should address exactly how the motivational processes might have impacts on specific cognitive or neural computations of error detection or conflict monitoring.

ERN as an Indicator of Motivation

Conclusions

Along with other researchers, we have suggested that the ERN
might have a strong motivational component. Given the cumulative evidence attesting to this possibility, it might not be too
far-fetched to expect that the self-centric effects would be more
pronounced for those who are genetically predisposed toward
reward seeking. Numerous studies have shown that carriers of
certain variants of a dopamine receptor gene, particularly, 7- or 2varying number tandem repeat polymorphisms of DRD4 (relative
to its more ancient 4-VNRP variant), are strongly disposed to
novelty/reward seeking and vulnerable to attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Grady et al., 2003). Future work should explore
whether the current finding might be modulated by the DRD4

Researchers have documented that many psychological findings
are limited to people from Western, educated, industrial, rich, and
democratic (or WEIRD) societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Our finding extends this claim by demonstrating that
the primacy of the personal self (vs. social others), widely assumed
as universal in the current social and behavioral science literature,
must be qualified under certain conditions that are characterized by
enhanced degrees of interdependence. Further, it showed that the
cultural variation is not limited solely to behavioral effects. To the
contrary, if anything, it was more pronounced at the neural, electrocortical level rather than in self-report, thereby directing the
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field in the direction of cultural neuroscience (Chiao, 2011; Kitayama & Park, 2010; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). Future work
should examine alternative principles of motivation to account for
various behavioral characteristics that are more evident among
non-Western populations.
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